Introduction
During the last decade, the foundation of a "second-chance culture" has been evolving in Europe. The introduction of rescue orientated reforms, both in the United Kingdom and France, signifies that the two jurisdictions place great emphasis on business recovery. This paper will briefly consider the impact of the reforms within the two jurisdictions. However statutory law tells only part of the story in reorganisations and the aim of this paper is, furthermore, to consider the various informal tools that are available in the United Kingdom and France and to provide a comparative analysis of the approach taken towards corporate rescue within the two jurisdictions.
The advantages of early-stage intervention
Although various formal and informal steps may be taken in order to give effect to a successful rescue, it is submitted that a traumatised company will often benefit from intervention before it gets to the stage of insolvency. In fact, it has been noted that most rescues are achieved through informal rescue, that is, rescue without recourse to the formal reorganisation laws. 1 Informal rescue mechanisms have a variety of advantages for the ailing company. From a director's and also a shareholder's perspective, engaging in informal rescue is preferable as it prevents any adverse publicity in relation to the company's financial troubles and hence protects its goodwill and reputation.
2 It could be argued that, by pursuing informal rescue, the company can effectively avoid the stigma which is attached to corporate failure and that the realisable value of its assets can be protected. 3 Moreover, one could argue that informal rescue is not as costly as court proceedings. However, it should be noted that informal rescue is not a cheap method of rescue 4 , as the turnaround professionals, who co-ordinate the process, often charge very hefty fees. 5 Moreover, since there is no court involvement in informal rescue, one could argue that the process is more flexible. 6 Nevertheless, a disadvantage of informal reorganisation is that the process is of a contractual nature, hence there is great reliance on a consensus being achieved with the creditors. The fact that there is a need to obtain the consent of all creditors during an informal reorganisation attempt arguably negates the advantages of informal rescue, as obtaining consent from dissenting creditors could prove to be a time-consuming and expensive course of action. 3 Ibid, 251-252. 4 For instance see ibid at p.309, where it is stated that the implementation cost of the London Approach have been high, i.e. up to £6 million. Admittedly, the London Approach is designed to be used in the context of large entity workouts (including banks), but the issue of costs remains a live one for all types of workout. 5 Karen Hopper Wruck, 'Financial Distress, Reorganisation and Organisational Efficiency ' (1990) 6 For instance the London Approach. 7 It could be said that a formal procedure, such as the Company Voluntary Arrangement in the United new law effectively improves the pre-existing pre-insolvency framework and, in particular, strengthens the mandat ad hoc procedure. In addition, the old amicable settlement procedure has gone through transformation and has been renamed as conciliation. Finally, the crucial contribution of the Law of 2005 to the French corporate rescue regime is that it creates a new debtor-in-possession procedure, namely the safeguard procedure, which is aimed at promoting the idea of intervention at an early stage, while leaving the company's incumbent management in the "driver's-seat". It should be noted that the Law of 2005 itself has been subject to reforms 11 in order to make the safeguard procedure more attractive, as this procedure in fact has enjoyed very limited use since its inception in 2005.
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It should be noted from the start that the issue of corporate rescue is approached in France in a rather different way, when compared to the United Kingdom. 13 A sharp distinction can be drawn between the United Kingdom system, which traditionally favours the interests of creditors, and the French system, which is primarily geared towards the preservation of an ailing company and hence serving to safeguard, wherever possible, the jobs of employees.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that both France and the United Kingdom have introduced reforms, which bring the two systems closer to each other. whilst the United Kingdom has softened its traditionally "creditor friendly" approach and introduced more collective insolvency procedures. In France, the preservation of a company is a matter of critical importance and is a paramount objective. In essence, certain groups'
interests, mainly those of creditors, may be sacrificed in order to rescue the company. 15 A significant feature of the French legislation is that it is specifically designed to urge directors to become aware of their companies' financial difficulties at an early stage and consequently to take steps so as to recover their position.
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The French corporate rescue system is arguably a very sophisticated system that has developed over many years. There are two types of treatment that may be adopted in order to help companies in difficulties, namely the out-of-court treatment and the judicial treatment. In particular, following the 2005 reforms, there are now three pre-insolvency institutions, the newly introduced safeguard-preservation procedure ("sauvegarde"), the renamed conciliation procedure ("conciliation") 17 and the renewed ad hoc mandate ("mandat ad hoc"). 
The "ad hoc mandate"
At a stage prior to insolvency there are two pre-existing (before the 2005 reforms) procedures designed to promote corporate rescue, namely the conciliation procedure and the ad hoc mandate. The ad hoc mandate is a procedure that has developed predominantly as a result of the practice of the Paris Commercial Court. 19 The initiation of this process usually involves the ailing business making a request to the President of the Commercial Court in order to appoint a "mandatee". 20 The request for the Court's assistance can be in the form of a registered letter and must be accompanied by a plan stating the measures that the company is going to take in order to repay its debts and also its plans for restructuring its business. Where the court is convinced that the company is likely to overcome its difficulties by means of a scheme of arrangement, it will order the appointment of a mandatee. Once the debtor and the creditors have agreed on a scheme of arrangement, the mandatee will establish its terms and conditions.
It is noteworthy that the agreement will be binding upon the agreed parties.
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An advantage of the ad hoc mandate is that it is subject to fewer formalities than amicable resolution and that, importantly, it offers more flexibility for informal and private negotiations between the debtor company and its debtors. undue public attention. In addition, confidentiality is a significant quality of the "mandat ad hoc" procedure, as it averts any unnecessary rumours, which could have a catastrophic effect on a rescue attempt. 22 However, it has been argued that, beyond the incentives that the current rescue regimes provides for directors to take early steps in order to avert a crisis, it is nevertheless the mindset of those involved in rescue which defines, largely, the level of success of a procedure. Accordingly, because directors regard the court as solely a "purveyor of sanctions" and are reluctant to approach the Commercial Court in order to prevent a financial crisis at an extra judicial stage, it is often the case that, when they decide to implement an extrajudicial settlement, it is too late and the only way forward would be judicial proceedings.
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Moreover, a significant drawback of this process is that no specific time frame is set out within which the process must be completed. Accordingly, the length of the process is left to the discretion of the President of the Court, although generally the duration of the mandate is short (with a maximum of 3-4 months). Another noteworthy disadvantage is that the availability of the procedure differs from court to court, depending on the experience of the judges.
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Nevertheless, where difficult cases are concerned, the lack of a specified time frame could also prove to be a great advantage as the debtor company could enter a long-lasting negotiation process in order to devise a viable reorganisation plan. In such cases it is common practice that the ad hoc mandate will be the preliminary stage to the amicable settlement procedure, because, 22 However, it has been argued that confidentiality of extra-judicial procedures is only theoretical in small or medium sizes towns, so that directors fear that the anxiety that will be aroused in their economic and financial partners by the disclosure of their difficulties may in fact worsen the company's financial position. See Marie- conciliator are partly set out by statute and partly by the President of the Court. However, the conciliator is by no means impotent; rather he is able to dramatically affect both the course and the outcome of the proceedings. In fact, the mission of the conciliator is to assist the debtor company to enter into negotiations with its principal creditors and any other affected parties, such as banks, and to conclude an agreement, which would ensure the continuation of the company's business. 32 An agreement should be concluded within a period not exceeding four months and may be extended by a month only.
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Ratification of the agreement and the role of the court
Under the previous regime, once an agreement had been concluded, it could be simply ratified by an order of the President of the Commercial Court. This allowed for the procedure to retain its crucially confidential character. However, it did not mean that the agreement was ratified for all purposes and for all time, as, on occasion, the court, in subsequent insolvency proceedings, in reviewing the agreement, had to modify the date of insolvency prescribed in the original order. 34 That in its turn created a "suspect period" during which certain transactions could be set aside and liability could potentially arise for those who delayed in filing for insolvency.
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The Law of 2005 importantly redresses this problem and enhances the court's involvement in the conciliation procedure by requiring it to ratify the conciliation agreement in certain circumstances. 36 Under the new regime, there is an option to have the conciliation agreement approved either by the President of the Commercial Court or by the Court itself. The crucial difference between the two being that, where an agreement has been approved by the President of the Court (constatation) confidentiality is retained, whereas, where enforced by the Court, the judgment becomes public (homologation). 37 It could be argued that making the agreement public could have an adverse effect upon the debtor company, as it could alarm its creditors.
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However, it is important to note that homologation only takes place upon request of the debtor and where the agreement does not harm the interests of any non-signatory creditors.
Additionally, as mentioned above, homologation has a stronger effect than constatation as the court is unable to question the date when the company's insolvency was pronounced.
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It could be argued that, although the publicity of an agreement could worsen the already ailing financial position of a company that the need to eliminate the stigma which is attached to corporate insolvency was emphasised in France. In particular, President Sarkozy, months before leaving office, highlighted the need to provide the right framework for enhancing the efficiency of French insolvency procedures and the need to afford a second chance to ailing companies and their managers. In particular he stated that "the law should give to the manager of a firm the means to get going again; it should help him to recover confidence when he is faced with difficulties; it should convince him that failure is not irreversible. The vision in
France of a failure that is final must come to an end." be afforded to those creditors in the context of any formal insolvency proceedings opened, as a result of the failure to endorse the conciliation agreement.
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The conciliation procedure is undoubtedly a significant pre-insolvency mechanism.
Nevertheless, there is a range of reasons why the process may fail. For instance, the debtor may seek help where it is too late and, consequently, where the company's difficulties have reached such a stage that recovery is impossible. Moreover, where the debtor's expectations for the salvation of the company as a going concern are too high, the creditors may not be convinced of the success of the process. Additionally, the process is likely to fail where, although an agreement has been reached, a creditor is unwilling to respect its terms.
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Moreover, the new law, importantly, addresses the concerns of banks and states that, except in cases where blatant fraud or inappropriate behaviour is manifested, those creditors who extend funds with a view to support the continuation of the ailing business, cannot at a later stage be held liable for improperly extending credit to the debtor. 45 This is known as the principle of "improper support" ("soutien abusif"), which developed in case-law in the mid-1970s by the Commercial Chamber of the Cour de Cassation. The doctrine imposes liability upon a lender for knowingly extending finance that is beyond the capacity of the debtor, thus contributing to the aggravation of the company's perilous situation and leading to its subsequent insolvency. necessary in order to protect creditors who, in the context of the conciliation process or a rescue plan, offered post-commencement funds.
The safeguard procedure-Chapter 11 a la Française
The new "safeguard" procedure is the core change introduced by the Law of 2005 in order to facilitate the reorganization of companies that are faced with financial crisis but that are not yet insolvent. The safeguard procedure is inspired by the American Chapter 11 model.
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Similarly to Chapter 11, the safeguard procedure is "a debtor in possession" procedure that allows the incumbent management to continue being in charge of the ailing business in order to help it overcome its financial difficulties. For instance, a safeguard plan could provide for a wide range of solutions, such as waivers of debt, a rescheduling of debt, a change in the company's control, or a sale of certain corporate assets.
The safeguard procedure provides a significant incentive to directors, who are encouraged to take early steps in order to save their company. However, a key pre-condition, which has to be satisfied by a debtor who wishes to enter into safeguard proceedings, is that the business is not insolvent. It is fundamental that the debtor has not actually ceased payments, as this remains the qualification for entering judicial rescue. 48 The Law of 2005 originally required that, in order for a debtor to be able to use the safeguard procedure, it should be shown that the company is faced with difficulties that it is not able to surmount and the nature of which is capable of leading to cessation of payments. 49 However, it is important to note that the reforms amended the criterion for entering into the safeguard procedure. 50 In particular, it is possible for a debtor to use the safeguard procedure before actually being in default on payment, on the condition that the debtor "provides proof of difficulties he cannot overcome". 51 Subsequently, it could be argued, on the one hand, that the reforms have drastically facilitated the entry for distressed companies into the safeguard proceedings. On the other hand, it could however, be argued that the changes to the entry requirements could cause additional uncertainty for creditors as to when a debtor may request the court's protection. 52 Nevertheless, it has been argued that the amendment of the test of entry into the safeguard procedure applies, in actual fact, more in theory than in practice, as the debtor must always prove to the court the genuineness of his financial difficulties.
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The safeguard procedure is implemented by a court judgment at the request of the debtor.
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The court will appoint an administrator (administrateur judiciaire) where proceedings are initiated in relation to businesses that are above a threshold, which is fixed by decree of the 49 Article 12, amending Article L 620-1 of the Commercial Code. 54 Article 621-3 states that the judgment opens an observation period for a maximum duration of six months, which may be renewed once by a reasoned decision at the request of the debtor, the administrator or the Public Prosecutor.
Council of State. 55 It should be noted that, by means of the reforms of 2008, the role of directors has been significantly enhanced, as it is now possible for the debtor to nominate an administrator for appointment by the court. 56 The administrator is required to supervise or assist the debtor in the performance of some or all management operations. 57 The judgment also triggers an automatic moratorium ("période d'observation") under the protection of which the debtor is permitted to propose a recovery plan. administrator, where proceedings benefit a debtor, whose number of employees and gross turnover are below the threshold fixed by decree. This discretionary facility to appoint, however, is likely to be exercised in situations where the court is not satisfied of the directors' suitability to remain in control, although statistics of such discretionary appointments are not available to evidence whether this facility is used and how often. Notwithstanding the reforms, it could be argued that France remains a pro-debtor/employee jurisdiction. However, the new regime portends changing attitudes, as it affords greater protection to creditors, who are involved in pre-insolvency proceedings. Notably, the safeguard procedure is seeking to strike a balance of preserving an ailing business while satisfying the creditors.
With regards to businesses whose number of employees and gross turnover exceeds the threshold, the Law of 2005 provides for a key novelty. It is stated that a financial creditors' committee and a principal suppliers' committee will be set up. 65 The role of the two committees is to approve the rescue proposals submitted by the debtor, assisted, it being the case, by the administrator. The establishment of the two committees is designed to increase the creditors' involvement in developing a viable reorganisation rescue plan. 66 The "preservation" procedure involves an extensive negotiation process, between the debtor and the creditors, who must cooperate in order to achieve a settlement of the company's debts.
The draft rescue plan must be presented for approval before the two creditors' committees within two months of their being formed. Following discussions with the debtor and the administrator, the committees will vote on the draft plan. It is important to note that, under the This effectively prevents creditors from splitting their debt among various entities of the same group in an attempt to obtain a majority in number.
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The subsequent exchange of opinions and recommendations form the final draft, which is submitted to the court for validation. Once the court has finally endorsed the rescue plan, it becomes binding upon all members of the committees. 69 However, dissenting or nonparticipating creditors are not bound by the decisions of the committees. Creditors, who are not members of the committees, must be consulted in parallel as to the strategy of settling the debts owed to them. 70 The role of the court is rather limited, as, in validating the plan, it must do so in conformity with the suggestions of the two creditors' committees. In addition, the court must ensure that the interests of all creditors are sufficiently protected. In 2010 further reforms were introduced in France, which provided for a new pre-pack procedure, the sauvegarde financière accélérée, 84 which was a variation of the safeguard procedure and is available to debtors in the banking and financial sectors. This fast-track procedure was designed to be available to debtors who, although entered into conciliation procedings, could also benefit from accessing the safeguard procedure. In order to benefit from the fast track preservation regime, such debtors were required, due to their size, to form creditors' committees for the purpose of approving a restructuring plan and to also seek the court's approval of the plan.
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In light of the continued impact of the financial crisis, further reforms of the French Insolvency law were introduced in 2014. 86 The latest reforms focus mainly on the sauvegarde regime and aim to facilitate access to the ordinary safeguard procedure and also redraws from the success of the fast track safeguard procedure and extends its application to all types of creditors. The 2014 reforms provide for a 'main-stream' sauvegarde financière procedure, which is to be available to debtors who have participated unsuccessfully to conciliation proceedings but can demonstrate that they have put in place a plan which would result in the continuation of their business. Arguably, the extended application of the sauvegarde financière accélérée regime for the benefit of all debtors reflects the effectiveness of the procedure. It remains to be seen whether or not the sauvegarde financière procedure will prove to be equally successful.
The UK corporate rescue ethos
The United Kingdom's insolvency law has traditionally been regarded as "creditor friendly"
because of the strong priority given to the protection of creditors' interests. Nevertheless, the 85 Ibid. 86 Ordinance no.2014-326 of 12 March 2014.
Enterprise Act 2002 was introduced in order to encourage a more collective approach towards corporate rescue, whereby all the interests in the company would be considered. This paper looks at the impact of the reforms introduced by the Act with special reference to the company voluntary arrangement, which is largely a "debtor in possession" procedure. Reference, will also be made to schemes of arrangement, which are largely used as re-organisation tools.
However, one should be reminded that schemes are not, strictly speaking, insolvency law measures.
Company Voluntary Arrangement
The company voluntary arrangement ("CVA"), introduced by the Insolvency Act 1986, is a "debtor in possession" process and is designed to facilitate the rehabilitation of financially troubled but viable enterprises. A CVA is a "compromise" between the debtor company and its creditors, whereby, for instance, the creditors agree to receive less than the amount due to them in discharge of their claims. Kingdom's insolvency law towards effective corporate rescue. Importantly, the 2000 Act introduced a moratorium for small businesses, (which is available to a company that chooses to use it) which imposes a temporary stay on all claims against the company and allows it with a short respite, so as to design a rescue plan. However, it should be noted that from the outset, the CVA procedure was not warmly received by insolvency practitioners and whether their attitude is likely to change following the reforms remains questionable. Commentators expressed the fear that the long-awaited transformation of the CVA procedure may be seen as a classic instance of "too little too late".
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Implementation of the CVA
The directors of a company may propose the adoption of a CVA. 95 The directors must prepare a proposal, following the advice of a nominee, who will be supervising the process. 96 The proposal must, inter alia, state the reasons why the company's directors believe that a CVA is desirable, the company's assets and their value, details of assets charged in favor of creditors, the nature and the amount of the company's liabilities, the duration of the CVA, the dates of distributions to creditors and the remuneration of the nominee/supervisor. 97 The nominee must be instructed to act by means of written notice and must receive a copy of the proposal from the directors. 98 In addition, within 28 days of being endorsed to act, the nominee must submit a report to the court stating whether in his opinion meetings of the company and its creditors should consider the proposal. 99 The directors are required to provide the nominee with a statement of the company's affairs, 100 with any information he requires in order to prepare his report 101 and give him access to the company's accounts and records.
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Furthermore, the nominee may call for a creditors' meeting, where creditors may consider whether to approve (with or without modifications) and go forward with the proposed CVA or not. 103 It is significant to note that, for voting purposes, the CVA treats all creditors as one single class, 104 in contrast to the scheme of arrangement. All creditors who receive notice of a creditors' meeting can vote on a CVA draft. In order for the CVA to become effective, it needs to be approved by the requisite majority at the meeting. 105 A significant reform of the CVA procedure was introduced by the Insolvency Act 2000. A CVA approved both by creditors and members is binding upon not only those creditors who had notice of the creditors' meeting, but also on creditors who did not have notice and creditors whose existence was unknown to those convening the meeting. 106 This is a significant development as, previously, creditors who did not receive notice of the meeting were not bound by the arrangement and had a right to enforce their claims against the debtor company. For instance, such creditors had a right to petition for the company to be wound up, undermining therefore the effectiveness of the CVA procedure. 107 It is significant to note that, under the new regime, the only creditors who can escape from the content of a CVA are those who are not eligible to vote. Therefore, the possibility of disruptive tactics on the part of dissenting creditors may be kept to a minimum. 108 In addition, it should be noted that secured creditors, unless they have irrevocably waived their security rights, 109 retain their right to enforce their claim and are only eligible to vote in respect of any unsecured part of their claim. 110 The Moratorium
As mentioned above, section 1A of the Insolvency Act 2000 introduced a moratorium for small businesses. The moratorium effectively provides the ailing company with some breathing space. For instance, during the moratorium, an administrative receiver cannot be appointed and no resolution aiming at the winding up of the company may be passed. 111 In addition, no steps may be taken to enforce security over the company's assets and no claims may be commenced or continued. 112 The directors of the company may apply for a moratorium, provided that they can present sufficient evidence that the CVA has a reasonable prospect of success. For instance, it must be shown that, during the moratorium, the company will have sufficient funds to allow it carry on business. It is noteworthy that, only if the nominee forms the professional judgment that the proposal has a reasonable prospect of being approved and implemented, 113 can the directors file the proposal with the court. 114 Provided that the nominee supports the directors' proposal, they have three working days to apply to the court for a moratorium. The directors must enclose with their application a statement of the company's affairs and a document stating the terms of the envisaged CVA.
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The moratorium applies for a 28 day period, but it is extendable for up to two more months.
During the moratorium, the directors will continue to manage the company, while the nominee monitors its affairs. 116 Upon approval of the proposed CVA, the nominee becomes the supervisor of the arrangement and his task is to oversee its implementation. limited use of this procedure has been made. It could be argued that is the case predominantly because of the radical reforms brought in by the Enterprise Act. 118 The virtual abolition of administrative receivership might have led one to believe that the impact of the CVA would be greater. 119 However, it is submitted that the new streamlined administration process is now preferred over a "free-standing" CVA. It is argued that a CVA proposal, combined with an application for administration, seems to be more popular because of the benefit of the moratorium (which is offered to companies of all sizes under the administration procedure).
However, a significant drawback of this is the increase in costs.
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Furthermore, it could be said that one of the main factors that renders the CVA as a less attractive means of corporate rescue is the fact that insolvency practitioners have never embraced the procedure. Flood argued that the possibility that CVAs could lead to a lower fee being paid to the insolvency practitioners, coupled with the lack of familiarity on their part with the CVA procedure, contributed significantly to the low uptake of CVAs. 121 Furthermore, it has been contended that insolvency practitioners failed to embrace the CVA procedure due to the procedure's significant weaknesses at the time when it was originally enacted. 122 It is submitted that, beyond the significant changes that reshaped the CVA procedure, a change of IP mindsets is needed, so as to convince them to have resort to the CVA at an early stage.
Unfortunately, current practice demonstrates that, notwithstanding the high profile case-law developments, which effectively manifest the fact that CVAs could prove to be a valuable restructuring tool, and the statutory improvements to the procedure, insolvency practitioners
continue to use tried and tested restructuring alternatives, such as administration (particularly pre-packs) and schemes of arrangement.
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Termination of a CVA Finally, termination of a CVA takes place either where the conditions of the arrangement have been successfully fulfilled or where the obligations undertaken have not been met. 124 In the former scenario, the supervisor shall make the appropriate distributions in accordance with the provisions of the arrangement. In the latter scenario, the supervisor's task is to take all the necessary steps in order to achieve a suitable variation of the terms of the arrangement or, where that is not feasible, to put the company into liquidation. decide whether or not to make a "meetings order". 134 In addition, stage two involves a meeting of creditors or members who will decide whether to approve the scheme. However, it is required that, prior to the meeting, sufficient information must be circulated so as to enable the creditors to reach an informed decision. 135 Finally, stage three involves a "sanction hearing", where the court will consider whether or not to sanction the scheme. 136 Once the scheme has obtained the required level of approval, the court may sanction the scheme. However, the court is not obliged to sanction a scheme which has received the approval of creditors. 137 Rather, the court has discretion to refuse to sanction a scheme, unless it is convinced that all the procedural requirements have been complied with; 138 in addition, the court must be satisfied that the classes were fairly represented by the parties who attended the meeting, 139 and, finally, the court must be satisfied that the terms of the scheme are fair. 140 It is argued that the requirement that a scheme of arrangement has to be approved by the court is a significant advantage of the procedure, because, once the arrangement has been courtapproved, it cannot be challenged by the company's creditors or its members. It could be argued that this might be one of the primary reasons why such schemes seem to be more popular than the CVA, as a CVA may be challenged on the grounds of unfair prejudice.
A significant advantage of the scheme of arrangement is that, although it has proved to be an effective re-organization tool, the procedure may be initiated without the requirement of an impending insolvency. 142 Accordingly, there is no need for an insolvency practitioner to be appointed and, importantly, the directors remain in control of the company. 143 It could be argued that the increasing popularity of schemes in rescue scenarios is implying a need to acknowledge its role as a corporate rescue procedure rather than purely regarding the scheme as simply a creature of company law. 144 Ultimately, one may raise the question whether there is a reason why the scheme of arrangement process should be used by insolvent companies or whether it should be restricted perhaps to solvent companies, where resort may be made to other procedures such as the CVA and administration.
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Conclusion
The insolvency laws of many European jurisdictions have undergone in depth reforms in advance of the recent financial meltdown which struck the corporate world. During the last few years, the global economy has witnessed, arguably, the most significant decline since the early 1930s. It could be argued that the adverse effect of the financial demise emphasised the need for many jurisdictions to ensure that effective corporate rescue mechanisms are in place, so as to enable traumatised businesses to recover and to be restored to profitability. With particular regard to the restructuring regimes of France and the United Kingdom, both jurisdictions took drastic steps towards the improvement of the existing pre-insolvency tools and the further development of a rescue culture.
It could be argued that the foundations of a 'second-chance' culture have been laid both in
France and the United Kingdom. The introduction of reforms to the insolvency laws in both jurisdictions demonstrates that both place great emphasis on business recovery. The reforms of the insolvency laws in both jurisdictions encourage corporate rescue by means of providing for sophisticated pre-insolvency mechanisms, as well as formal restructuring procedures.
With particular regard to informal rescue procedures, it could be argued that the insolvency laws of both jurisdictions provide a secure legal framework, which would allow debtors to swiftly negotiate their debts with the creditors without seeking the protection of the courts, but which might at the same time provide for the ability to obtain guidance from commercial judges or insolvency practitioners who have a high level of experience and expertise in the area.
In France, the 2005 reforms and, in particular, the enactment of the safeguard procedure, signify the intention of the legislator to encourage early intervention. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, soon after the introduction of the safeguard procedure, the need for additional reforms was expressed, as flaws of the procedure became apparent in the Eurotunnel case. 
